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RECENT CASES
haps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to an
insanity case. By adopting a standard, the Court could put an end to
the divergence of opinion existing among the federal courts as to which
best satisfies justice. Many state courts would also be persuaded by a
Supreme Court decision. Until the Court adopts a position on this
issue, the confusion and complexity will continue to intensify.
Joe Bill Campbell
CRM NAL LAw-LAwYEBs-FES-ATroRNEY's FEES FOR INDiGENT CRIM-
NAL DEFENDANTs.-The circuit court appointed counsel to represent a
defendant in a Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 11.42 motion
proceeding. The motion was denied. Counsel moved the court for
allowance of a fee, to be paid by the county or other public source,
for his services in the proceeding. The motion of counsel was denied.
Both motions were appealed together. Held: Affirmed. While there is
merit in the proposition that assigned counsel should be compensated,
in the absence of legislation providing funds for this purpose, attorneys
will be required to devote their time and knowledge to the representa-
tion of indigents in criminal cases as a fulfillment of a professional
duty. Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).
Appellant-counsel, relying on a decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oregon,' argued that the public use of
his services and knowledge by the court was an unlawful deprivation
of property without just compensation under the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution. The Oregon federal court said
that while, historically, the privileges of the attorney in society once
required him to represent the indigent without compensation, the
special privileges of his position no longer exist.
The production of witnesses for an indigent defendant is a phase of
due process-the supplying of a transcript of proceedings to an indigent
defendant through services, expertise, and facilities of the court reporter
is a phase of due process, as is the supplying of mental and physical
examination through the services and expertise of a physician, and so
must also be a supplying of a license, time, expertise, office facilities and
expense of an attorney for the indigent. The supplying (of an attorney
at every stage] . . . is a public purpose. 2
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
man, 141 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. 1966) (citing Freeman); Commonwealth v. Ahearn,
218 A.2d 561, 572 (Pa. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
'Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
2 Id. at 493.
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The federal district court's decision was subsequently reversed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 That court rejected the argument
that the public was "taking" an attorney's expertise without due pro-
cess; it referred first to the tradition of free legal services to indigents
accused of crimes and second to the special position of lawyers in
society.
The common law practice of free legal services for the indigent
accused finds its contemporary statement in the canons of legal ethics. 4
The canons provide that a lawyer assigned by the court to assist an
indigent ought not ask to be excused for any trivial reason and
"should always exert his best efforts in [the client's] ... behalf."5 The
canon, however, is not the basis of the argument, but a reflection.
Traditionally every member of the bar in his oath of admission agrees
to be bound by certain general rules, including representing without
compensation any defendant in a criminal case assigned by the court.6
Except when otherwise directed, such services of assigned counsel
have always been free.7 It is arguable that this theory of obligation is
not peculiar to our legal system; it has characterized the lawyer's
position in all civilized communities from the earliest times. "No
statute has ever been necessary to give the court the right to call upon
the bar, its power is inherent, and statutes only declare it."8 This con-
cept is predicated upon the questionable assumption that the attorney's
conscience, his respect for his profession, "his love of freedom and
liberty guaranteed to every American by the Constitution, and for a
square deal will spur him on to see that" the indigent shall have
effective assistance and a fair trial, regardless of personal conse-
quences.0
The notion of special privileges existing for lawyers, however, has
been significantly altered by several court rulings. Illustrative of the
change was the Supreme Court's pronouncement that if one meets
the prescribed qualifications he must be admitted to practice as a
matter of right, and once having acquired the license he cannot be
deprived of it except through the judicial exercise of due process.'0
The right to follow a profession has carried with it the right to be
compensated by the court independent of the will of the legislature."
3 United States v. Dillon, 846 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1965).4 AmiuacAN BAn Assoc TxoN, CANON OF PnorsiSoNAL ETmcs (1948).
5 Id., Canon 4, at 8.
6 State v. Rush, 87 N.J. Super. 49, 207 A.2d 724 (1965).
7 People v. Fernandez, 109 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1951).
8 Dnmawn, LEGAL ETmcs 62 (1953).9 Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1955).
'0 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1956); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956).
11 Knox County Council v. State, 29 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1940).
[Vol. 55,
REcENT CAsEs
While it may appear that such a position is new and radical, the
Indiana court announced in 1854 that:
the idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges and therefore being
more honorable than any other is not congenial to our institutions. And
that any class should be paid for their particular services in empty
honors, is an obsolete idea, belonging to another age and to a state of
society hostile to liberty and equal rights.12
This view has been restated in several jurisdictions to the effect that
attorneys cannot be compelled to perform services for an indigent,
even where statutes provide for compensation.' 3 Definitive statements
such as these have manifested themselves in provisions in forty-four
states for payment of private or public counsel appointed by the
court in a criminal action.14 Kentucky is one of only six states which
do not pay assigned counsel under any circumstances. 1 Since compen-
sation is also provided by the federal government for court-appointed
counsel in federal criminal cases, 16 it is clear that the traditional con-
cept has changed. The question now is whether there is a rational
basis for change.
A former Attorney General of the United States, Robert F. Ken-
nedy, has said:
To date we have responded to the need for representation by assigning
private lawyers to take cases free. We have proceeded on the assumption
that society's obligation to the accused can be redeemed not by society
or by the Government, but simply by telling private lawyers: "Defend
this man. Give him your time and your advice. Protect his rights-and
then pay for it out of your own pocket."
How wrong this system is was pointed up by a recent study con-
ducted for the Department of Justice. The study concluded (1) that
"present practices sometimes induce a plea of guilty because appointed
counsel recognizes the futility of electing a contest in the absence of re-
sources to litigate effectively'; and (2) that "deficiencies of the present
system adversely affect the quality of the defense made."
12 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
13State ex rel. Old Underwriters, Inc. v. Bell, 195 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 1964);
Sandoval v. Tarrikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1965).
14Grove, Gideon's Trumpet: Taps for an Antiquated System? A Proposal
for Kentucky, 54 Ky. L.J. 527 (1966). It is interesting to note that three days
after the Kentucky decision in the instant case the New Jersey court decided sub-
stantially the same issue for the appellant, but gave the legislature one year to
find the financial means before the ruling would take effect. State v. Rush, 46
N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
15 Those states in which there is no compensation for attorneys are as follows:
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah. SmvEnsrEN,
DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CmuINAL CASES xN AmEnICAN STATE CousrTs 253-67
(1965).
16Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1964). While legal services are provided under the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 508 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1964), these services are




The study showed that pleas of guilty are entered much more fre-
quently-in some areas three times as often-by defendants with assigned
counsel than those represented by paid private counsel who have both
the facilities and the incentive to make independent investigations. De-
fendants with appointed counsel, the study showed, had less chance to
get charges against them dismissed, less chance of acquittal when they
went to trial, and greater chance, if convicted, of being sent to jail in-
stead of being placed on probation. 17
Under the system of court-appointed counsel without compensation,
a small segment of the legal profession is forced to bear the total cost
of providing protection for the rights of the indigent criminal de-
fendant. 8 Likewise, this system makes a mockery of constitutional
guarantees when young inexperienced lawyers are asked to match
skills against the prosecuting attorney's highly trained staff with
modern devices of detection and investigation at their disposal.19
In response to these legal problems, the American Bar Association
has suggested programs to assure adequate representation for indigents.
As John W. Cummiskey, Chairman of the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee of Legal Aid Work, has said: "One of the six
major objectives of the American Bar Association is 'Promotion and
establishment within the legal profession of organized facilities for the
furnishing of legal services to all citizens at a cost within their
means."20
Pursuant the goals of the Committee on Legal Aid Work, the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the American Bar
Association adopted the recommendations of the committee and
formulated the following guidelines:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person unable to employ counsel
who faces the possibility of the deprivation of his liberty or other serious
criminal sanction....
(7) Maintain in each county in which the volume of criminal cases re-
quiring assignment of counsel is such as to justify the employment of at
least one full-time lawyer to handle the work effectively, a defender
office, either as a public officer or as a quasi-public or private organiza-
tion.21
Forty-four states have made these guidelines a reality by adopting
various programs. Some states have purely public defender systems,
others have only private counsel compensated by the court, and still
others have combinations of the two. Regardless of the type program,
17 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057 Before the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1963).
18 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057, supra note 17, at 52.
19 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057, supra note 17, at 76.2o Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057, supra note 17, at 93.
2 1 NATIONAL IEGAL Am AND DEFENDER AssocriAnoN, GuIDEL NEs FOR ADE-
QUATE DEFENsE SYsTFws 8 (1964).
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the legislatures have been able to find the means for the compensation.
While the cost per criminal trial of representation varies from district-
to-district and state-to-state, it appears that the range is from forty to
fifty dollars per case.22 Other states have found the means to assure
adequate representation, and there is nothing peculiar to Kentucky
which would indicate that similar programs could not be adopted.
The social value of a comprehensive program would outweigh its
initial cost, in any event, in that better attorneys would be attracted
into the field of representing all criminal defendants.
However, in spite of the need for effective counsel for indigents
in criminal actions, the Kentucky Court refused to take action. Instead
the Court relied heavily upon the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit holding in the Dillon case23 to say that the common
law practice should be sustained. However, neither the federal court
nor the Kentucky Court mentioned that when the Dillon case was
ultimately decided the provisions for compensation in federal courts
were in effect. The absence of judicial treatment of the statutory pro-
visions made for compensation in the federal system was conspicious.
It would be reasonable to assume that, while the federal court did not
mention the legislation, it must have significantly influenced the case;
compensation was not provided at the time the case was first tried,
and as a practical matter, the court did not wish to have two systems
of compensation in the federal court structure. This reasoning, how-
ever, is not applicable to Kentucky law, as no such legislation presently
exists.
The Kentucky Court in the instant case also indicated that it
thought compensation for court-appointed counsel might be feasible
for this state, but that it was not the Court's duty to initiate it. How-
ever, while the Legislature could appropriate funds for this purpose,
political pressures require the budget to be spent for more vote-
acquiring projects such as roads, teachers' salaries, and welfare. As
it appears that court-appointed counsel can wait a while longer, the
Legislature will not make the first move, but will defer to someone
else. Waiting, however, will not solve the legal problems of indigents.
Even advocates of the tradition of unpaid court-appointed counsel
recognize the problem and express hope that some system will be
found to facilitate effective representation. 24
The question is not academic or one of philosophical honor, but a
22 Grove, supra note 14, at 560, 575.
23 United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).24 Christensen, Requiem for an Abandoned Commitment, 51 A.B.AJ. 741
MR1965 Palmore, Counsel for the Indigent in Criminal Cases, 29(3) Ky. S.B.J. 21(1065).
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matter of realistic ethics. It is well established that an accused is
entitled to representation regardless of the offense.2 5 This right is not
superficial, but one of substance.2 6 If such a right exists for the accused,
a duty falls upon the attorney appointed by the court to represent the
accused in a capable manner. In the past, decisions have been reversed
where either the trial court or the court-appointed counsel was
delinquent in executing its duties.2r Such action tends to indicate that
the Supreme Court of the United States and the highest courts in the
several states are concerned with adequate representation of the
indigent accused. This process without compensation may, however,
be economically burdensome, at times so great as to endanger the
lawyer's career.28
A comprehensive program which would afford adequate repre-
sentation in criminal actions is overdue in this state. We must be
realistic in our appraisal of the legal profession. While it may be that
every member of the bar proclaims his readiness to serve as counsel
for indigents, the courts, for various reasons, tend to appoint recent
graduates. Such experience is good for the young attorney, but it does
not always give the best protection to the accused. In relation to the
magnitude of the problem of representing indigents in criminal pro-
ceedings, few law students are inclined to enter the area of criminal
law when a livelihood is not available in such a practice. Thus, we
find ourselves in a vicious circle; recent graduates with little interest in
criminal law are appointed to represent the indigents; due to their
superficial interest, the defense is inadequate. In some moral sense, this
situation may be deplorable, but in reality it exists and will con-
tinue until action is taken either by the Court or the Legislature to
provide stimulus for lawyers to take a personal interest in representing
the indigent accused.
David Emerson
CluMINAL LAW - HoMIcmE - Mtru- MANsrAuGEm-R- BzrmAL FoR
MAsNAUGHTEm ON EvmENcE OF MuanEH.-At the first trial for murder
of his wife, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The
evidence, while possibly supporting defendant's theory of suicide, did
not show any mitigating circumstances which would have allowed a
2 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
2 7 Curry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1965); Rayon v. State,
267 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1954).
28 Comment, 16 HASTNGS L.J. 274 (1964).
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